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Abstract
Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate
the determinants of banks’ sovereign exposures and their effects on lending during
and after the crisis. Public, bailed-out and poorly capitalized banks responded to sov-
ereign stress by purchasing domestic public debt more than other banks, consistent
with both the “moral suasion” and the “carry trade” hypothesis. Public banks’ pur-
chases grew especially in coincidence with the largest ECB liquidity injections,
which therefore reinforced the “moral suasion” mechanism. Bank exposures signifi-
cantly amplified the impact of sovereign stress on bank lending to domestic firms,
as well as on lending by foreign subsidiaries of stressed-country banks to firms in
non-stressed countries. Altogether, our evidence connects this amplification effect
and its cross-border transmission to the moral suasion exerted by domestic govern-
ments on banks during the crisis.
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1. Introduction
The euro-area debt crisis and its aftermath are a natural testing ground to assess the role of
banks’ exposures in the transmission of sovereign stress to the credit market. In this paper,
the evidence generated by the crisis is used to address two closely related research questions:
first, how did banks change their public debt holdings in response to sovereign stress, and
how did their response vary depending on their characteristics? Second, did their different
sovereign exposures amplify the transmission of stress to their lending? To answer these
questions, we draw on a unique data set covering 226 euro-area banks at monthly fre-
quency from 2007 to 2015. Exploiting the heterogeneity in banks’ characteristics allows us
to test competing hypotheses regarding the response of their sovereign exposures to sover-
eign stress. Furthermore, exploiting the bank-specific dynamics of exposures enables us to
quantify their contribution to the transmission of sovereign stress to lending. We establish
two main results.
First, publicly owned and recently bailed-out banks reacted to sovereign stress by pur-
chasing significantly more domestic public debt than other banks, and boosted their pur-
chases especially at the time of the two large liquidity injections by the ECB in December
2011 and March 2012. Since public and recently bailed-out banks are more likely to yield
to political pressure than other banks, the evidence is consistent with their public debt pur-
chases during the crisis being driven by the respective government’s pressure—the “moral
suasion” hypothesis.1 The low funding costs due to the ECB liquidity injections appear to
have reinforced this mechanism: the estimates imply that, at the time of these injections,
stressed-country public banks increased their sovereign debt holdings by 17% more than
private banks. We also find that stressed-country banks with low regulatory capital bought
more domestic public debt than other banks, in line with the view that they engaged in
yield-seeking behavior to gamble for resurrection—the “carry trade” hypothesis. The two
hypotheses appear to have about the same explanatory power and to apply to almost com-
pletely disjoint sets of banks in our sample.
Second, stressed-country banks with larger sovereign exposures cut lending more deeply
than less exposed banks when sovereign stress increased, and expanded lending more when
sovereign stress abated. The granular nature of our data enables us to estimate precisely the
amplification effect associated with sovereign exposures: a 1-standard-deviation drop in
the price of government bonds reduced the loan growth of the median domestic bank by
1 This hypothesis is formalized by Uhlig (2013), who shows that fiscally vulnerable governments have
an incentive to allow domestic banks to hold home risky bonds, in order to borrow more cheaply,
while non-vulnerable governments will impose tighter regulation. Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli
(2014) argue that sovereign stress heightens this incentive, generating a positive relationship be-
tween sovereign yields and banks’ holdings of domestic debt, and refer to this prediction as the
“moral suasion” hypothesis, a label also used in subsequent work.
2104 C. Altavilla et al.
1.4 percentage points, which is 20% of the standard deviation of loan growth. This amplifi-
cation mechanism can account for the entire drop in lending by the average bank in stressed
countries at the peak of the sovereign crisis, that is, between mid-2010 and mid-2012.
In principle, domestic customers may reduce their demand for lending at times of sover-
eign stress, thereby introducing an omitted-variable bias in our lending regressions. The un-
consolidated nature of our banks’ balance-sheet data helps us to address this endogeneity
concern: we investigate whether losses on sovereign debt incurred by parent banks in
stressed countries affected their foreign subsidiaries’ loans to firms in non-stressed coun-
tries, whose demand for credit should not respond to sovereign stress. The sovereign expos-
ures of the parent banks turn out to affect the lending of their foreign subsidiaries, to an
extent that is comparable to that found for lending to domestic firms by the respective par-
ent banks. This indicates that our estimates of the amplification effect are not driven by
demand-side factors. Beside addressing endogeneity concerns, these estimates have substan-
tive economic implications: they show that banks’ sovereign exposures amplify the impact
of sovereign debt repricing not only on their domestic but also on their foreign lending, and
thereby contribute to the international transmission of sovereign stress.
Another possible concern is that banks’ losses on sovereign holdings may not be exogen-
ous in our lending regressions, for instance because banks with larger sovereign holdings
have clients whose solvency is more sensitive to sovereign risk. To this purpose, we build
on the previous findings that public ownership and bailout events are key determinants of
banks’ sovereign exposures, and interact these variables with sovereign repricing to con-
struct instruments for banks’ losses on sovereign holdings. The exclusion restriction
required for the validity of these instruments is that the loans of public and bailed-out
banks react differently to sovereign stress only because they have larger sovereign expos-
ures: this restriction would be violated if the customers of public and bailed-out banks be-
came riskier at times of sovereign stress. We show instead that for these banks the fraction
of impaired loans does not increase more than for other banks at the time of sovereign
stress, thus supporting the exclusion restriction. The instrumental variable (IV) regressions
confirm the amplification effect of sovereign exposures on stressed-country bank lending.
These IV estimates indicate that this amplification mechanism can be traced back to the
moral suasion exerted by governments on banks during the crisis, underscoring the tight
connection between the two research issues addressed by our analysis.
Our paper is related to a large literature on the drivers of domestic sovereign exposures
during sovereign crises. Indirect evidence on such drivers was first provided by Acharya
and Steffen (2015), who document that the loadings of bank stock returns on sovereign
debt returns are higher for low-capitalized and recently bailed-out banks. They interpret
these findings as evidence for the “carry trade” and “moral suasion” hypotheses, respect-
ively. This interpretation is warranted if factor loadings proxy for banks’ sovereign expos-
ures, but not if these loadings were to reflect just banks’ dependence on public bailout
guarantees: the stocks of less capitalized banks and recently bailout banks may be more sen-
sitive to public debt returns simply because they depend more on the government as back-
stop. Instead, our month-by-month observations of banks’ sovereign holdings enable us to
directly estimate the impact of sovereign stress on the portfolios of banks with different
characteristics.
Ongena, Popov, and van Horen (2016) find that stressed-country domestic banks
bought more sovereign debt than foreign banks when the domestic government’s financing
needs were particularly high. De Marco and Macchiavelli (2014) report that banks with
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sizeable government ownership or politically appointed directors feature more home-biased
sovereign portfolios than privately owned and managed banks. These findings are consist-
ent with the “moral suasion” hypothesis. Instead, Buch, Koetter, and Ohls (2016) report
evidence supporting the “carry trade” hypothesis using granular information on German
banks. Finally, Horvath, Huizinga, and Ioannidou (2015) test both hypotheses, but in sep-
arate regressions, so that from their estimates it is unclear whether both would have ex-
planatory power in a nested specification.
Other papers investigate whether central bank liquidity fueled the purchase of sovereign
debt by banks. Drechsler et al. (2016) document that less capitalized banks bought more
domestic sovereign debt after the extraordinary liquidity provision by the ECB in
December 2011 and March 2012. However, Peydro, Polo, and Sette (2017) find that
more—not less—capitalized Italian banks bought high-yield bonds when monetary policy
softened, countering the idea that liquidity injections encouraged banks’ carry trades.
Ongena, Popov, and van Horen (2016) find that domestic and public banks engaged in
larger sovereign debt purchases but these were not fueled by the ECB liquidity injections. In
contrast with their evidence, we document that the ECB liquidity injections in 2011 and
2012 amplified the “moral suasion” channel, since they appear to have enabled public
banks to buy more sovereign debt. Instead, we find no evidence that these liquidity injec-
tions reinforced the “carry trade” channel, by making poorly capitalized banks more
inclined to buy stressed public debt.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the transmission of sovereign stress to lend-
ing activity. Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014a) present a model in which sovereign de-
faults reduce private lending by undermining the balance sheets of domestic banks, the
more so the larger their holdings of government debt, and test these predictions on cross-
country evidence; they also test them on bank-level data in a companion paper (Gennaioli,
Martin, and Rossi, 2014b). Becker and Ivashina (2014) use company data on bank borrow-
ing and bond issuance to show that European companies were more likely to replace bank
loans with bond issues when banks in their country held more domestic sovereign debt and
when that debt was risky. De Marco (2017) and Popov and Van Horen (2014) show that
the euro-area banks with larger sovereign exposures in the EBA stress tests participated to
the syndicated loan market less than banks with lower exposures, and raised their lending
rates more sharply.2 All these studies suffer from the lack of accurate time series of bank-
level data for banks’ sovereign exposures. Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014b) rely on
banks’ total bond holdings, which lump domestic government bonds together with non-
domestic bonds. The other three studies use data on sovereign exposures drawn from the
EBA stress tests, and thus refer only to (at most) four dates and to a small sample of system-
ically important banks.
To identify the transmission of sovereign stress to lending via banks’ sovereign ex-
posures, it is important to control for the demand for loans by firms. The recent con-
tributions by Acharya et al. (2015) and Carpinelli and Crosignani (2017) achieve such
identification following the methodology proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008): they
analyze the change in loans issued to the same firm by banks with different exposures
to sovereign risk. In our study, we control for loan demand in other ways, since we do
not have bank–firm matched loan data. However, our data are more complete in terms
2 De Marco (2017) documents this finding also using yearly balance-sheet data on bank loans, be-
sides syndicated loan data.
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of coverage of banks, countries, and time, as they refer to a sample of banks providing
about 70% of total euro-area lending, and track bank-level sovereign exposures and
lending policies throughout the crisis and after its abatement, rather than at specific
dates and for a segment of the credit market. In contrast, Acharya et al. (2015) meas-
ure bank lending with data on syndicated loans, which account for just 10% of total
euro-area lending and cater mostly to large, established corporations, while Carpinelli
and Crosignani (2017) focus only on Italian banks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data, illustrating the
variation in bank-level exposures and presenting some stylized facts. Section 3 analyzes the
determinants of banks’ domestic sovereign exposures. Section 4 examines whether these ex-
posures influenced the impact of sovereign stress on bank lending. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Stylized Facts
This section describes our data and sets out some stylized facts about euro-area banks’
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds and their relationship with bank lending. These not
only help to gauge the correlations in the data at aggregate level but also point to the add-
itional insights that can be gleaned from bank-level data.
Our analysis is based on a unique, proprietary data set of balance-sheet items (BSI) at
bank level (Individual Balance-Sheet Items or IBSI), which is regularly updated by the ECB.
We use monthly observations on the main balance-sheet indicators (assets and liabilities)
from June 2007 to February 2015. The sample contains a total of 226 unconsolidated
banks in eighteen euro-area countries (Table I), the highest coverage being in the largest
countries: Germany (sixty), France (thirty-two), Italy (twenty-four), and Spain (twenty-
three). The banks are observed at unconsolidated level: 119 group head banks, 49 domestic
subsidiaries, and 59 foreign subsidiaries (some affiliated to UK or Danish groups).3
These data are merged with data on bank share ownership from Bankscope and hand-
collected data about bailout dates from the EU Commission state aid database. The data in-
clude monthly observations of the benchmark 10-year and 5-year sovereign yields and
survey-based consensus yield forecasts at 3-month and 12-month horizons. Yields for euro-
area countries are drawn from Datastream; survey-based forecasts are from Consensus
Economics and are available only for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.
For details on data definitions and sources, see the Appendix.
The representativeness of the sample is shown in Table II, which reports main assets
(defined as total assets less derivatives), loans to non-financial corporations and holdings of
government bonds for the banks in our data set as a fraction of the national aggregate,
drawn from the ECB BSI database. On average, for the main variables our data cover about
3 Our analysis is based on the IBSI data release of April 15, 2015, which contained data for 252
banks. Of these, we removed twenty-six banks featuring one or more of the following: (i) less than
12months of observations were available for loans and exposures; (ii) loans equal to zero for the
entire sample (with at most sparse spikes); (iii) frequent and extreme jumps in exposures or loans.
Of the removed banks, two are Finnish, five French, five German, two Irish, two Italian, five Latvian,
one is from Luxembourg, one Slovenian, and three are Spanish. We also remove all negative values
of domestic sovereign holdings, equity, main assets, and lending.
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70% of the corresponding country aggregate. The bottom row of the table shows that
weighting country coverage by GDP does not change the results.
Our data are far more representative of the euro-area banking system than those used in
previous studies, along several dimensions. First, our sample has data for the sovereign ex-
posures of 226 banks, compared with at most 91 banks in the pre-2014 EBA stress test
data, and for 93 months, compared with the few snapshots of the EBA stress tests. Second,
as illustrated in Table II, our bank loan data cover almost 70% of the corresponding na-
tional lending aggregates, compared with the 10% coverage of the syndicated loan data
used by Popov and Van Horen (2014), De Marco (2017), and Acharya et al. (2015).
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are shown in Panel A of Table III, and for
bank characteristics in Panel B. As in the subsequent analysis, the statistics are computed
separately for two groups of countries: “stressed” (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Spain) and “non-stressed” (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia). We define as “stressed”—
that is, subject to high sovereign stress—countries whose 10-year sovereign yield exceeded
6% (or, equivalently, four points above the German yield) for at least one quarter in our
sample period.
Table III reveals that banks in these two groups of countries behaved quite differently in
several respects. First, their domestic sovereign exposures (the ratio of government debt
holdings to main assets) are greater in stressed countries (4.9%) than in non-stressed ones
(3.8%), while the opposite applies to non-domestic euro-area exposures (1% versus
Table I. Distribution of the banks by country and ownership
For each country, the table reports the total number of individual banks and their breakdown ac-
cording to the country in which they operate and domestic or foreign ownership.
Total Domestic banks Foreign banks
Head banks subsidiaries
Austria 9 6 2 1
Belgium 10 3 0 7
Cyprus 5 4 0 1
Estonia 4 1 0 3
Finland 5 3 0 2
France 32 8 20 4
Germany 60 39 13 8
Greece 6 4 2 0
Ireland 11 3 1 7
Italy 24 15 4 5
Luxembourg 10 3 0 7
Malta 4 3 0 1
Netherlands 10 7 0 3
Portugal 6 4 0 2
Slovakia 3 0 0 3
Slovenia 4 2 0 2
Spain 23 14 6 3
Total 226 119 48 59
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2.2%).4 Hence, in stressed countries the sovereign debt portfolios of banks are more
“home-biased” than in non-stressed countries. (Unfortunately, we cannot measure the di-
versification of sovereign debt portfolios more precisely, because our data do not break
non-domestic exposures down by sovereign issuer.) Second, banks accumulated domestic
sovereign debt twice as fast in stressed as in non-stressed countries (2% versus 1% on a
quarterly basis). Third, in stressed countries loans to firms are a larger fraction of bank
assets than in non-stressed countries but grow less.
However, in both groups of countries there is considerable dispersion in the sovereign
exposures of banks, as well as in the growth of bank sovereign holdings and lending to
firms. Sovereign exposures feature substantial variation both over time and cross-
sectionally: in the stressed countries, their overall standard deviation is 4.9%, the same
Table II. Sample representativeness
For each country, the table shows the aggregate values of main assets, loans to non-financial
corporations (NFCs) and holdings of government debt in our dataset in January 2015 as per-
centages of the same variables in the aggregate data reported in the BSI statistics of the ECB.
Ratio of IBSI aggregates to BSI totals (%)
Main assets Loans to non-financial
corporations
Bank holdings of
sovereign debt
Austria 40 38 50
Belgium 72 81 84
Cyprus 73 87 86
Estonia 87 90 74
Finland 85 82 86
France 74 68 87
Germany 64 48 74
Greece 92 91 85
Ireland 38 74 66
Italy 63 59 48
Luxembourg 34 69 36
Malta 30 81 77
Netherlands 87 89 91
Portugal 69 70 66
Slovakia 55 57 63
Slovenia 54 50 69
Spain 84 86 86
Average 64 72 71
Weighted average 69 64 73
4 Banks’ sovereign holdings are partly at market prices and partly at book values. They are marked
to market if the bank classes them in its “trading book” (i.e., either “available for sale” or “held for
trading”). They are at book values if the bank classes them in its “banking book” (i.e., “held to ma-
turity”). Our data do not contain the breakdown between these two components. In the forty-five
euro-area banks present in the EBA stress test data, trading-book sovereigns account for 59% of
the total for banks in stressed and 48% in non-stressed countries.
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value as their mean; in the non-stressed countries, it is 6.6%, with a mean of 3.8%. The
growth rate of domestic sovereign holdings is more volatile, its standard deviation being
23.1% in stressed countries and 20.1% in non-stressed ones. Both values are very large
compared with the respective means of 1.9% and 1%. Both between-banks and within-
bank variation in these variables are central to our empirical strategy.
Panel B shows that the average bank in the two groups of countries has similar charac-
teristics: it is quite large, highly leveraged (more so in the non-stressed countries), yet with
Table III. Descriptive statistics
The table presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of banks’ monthly sovereign ex-
posures, loans to firms (Panel A), and characteristics (Panel B). The stressed countries are
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain; the non-stressed countries are
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and
Slovakia. Domestic sovereign exposures are domestic sovereign debt as a fraction of the cor-
responding bank’s main assets. Bank lending is the bank loans to non-financial corporations as
a fraction of the corresponding banks’ main assets. Bank lending growth and sovereign hold-
ings growth are the quarterly growth rates (in percent) of bank loans to non-financial compa-
nies and of their sovereign holdings. Leverage ratio is the ratio of banks’ total assets to their
equity capital. T1/RWA is the ratio of Tier-1 common equity to risk-weighted assets. Public is
the fraction of banks’ shares owned by local or national government or publicly controlled insti-
tutions (Fondazioni in Italy, Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain, and Sparkasse and Landesbank in
Germany). Bailout equals 1 starting in the quarter in which a bank was bailed out (unless
acquired in the two subsequent quarters), and 0 before that date.
Panel A. Domestic exposures, bank lending, and interest rates (%)
Stressed countries Non-stressed countries
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Domestic sovereign exposures (%) 4.9 4.0 4.9 3.8 1.7 6.6
Non-domestic sovereign exposures (%) 1.0 0.0 3.5 2.2 0.6 3.8
Bank lending to firms (%) 25.3 25.3 14.0 15.7 13.1 12.6
Bank lending growth (%) 0.4 0.3 12.5 0.2 0.3 10.8
Sovereign holdings growth (%) 1.9 0.0 23.1 1.0 0.0 20.1
Panel B. Bank characteristics
Stressed countries Non-stressed countries
Mean Median Standard deviation Mean Median Standard deviation
Assets (billion euro) 72.1 41.0 93.2 89.0 35.5 137.5
Leverage ratio 22.1 10.3 116.0 29.0 17.4 172.8
T1/RWA (%) 9.4 9.3 2.7 10.1 9.9 3.4
Deposit/liabilities (%) 66.7 68.9 16.9 64.3 67.7 24.8
Public 24.3 0.0 38.4 22.9 0.0 40.7
Bailout 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2
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high regulatory capital ratios (9.4% in the stressed and 9.9% in the non-stressed countries),
and mainly reliant on deposit funding (about two-third in both sets of countries). Also, gov-
ernment intervention in the banks of the two groups is similar, with average public stakes
of 24% and 23%, respectively (public ownership being defined as shareholdings of local or
national government and of publicly controlled institutions); and the frequency of observa-
tions referring to bailed-out banks is 10% for both sets of countries (bailout being a dummy
equal to 1 during and after a bailout, and 0 otherwise).
Figures 1–3 add a dramatic time dimension to two stylized facts that emerge from Table
III, namely the rapid growth of banks’ domestic sovereign exposures and the sharp decline
in the loan-to-asset ratio in stressed countries, in striking contrast with the experience of
non-stressed countries. Figure 1 shows that the different pattern of sovereign exposures be-
tween the two groups of countries is driven by the exposures of the head banks: the median
domestic subsidiary in the stressed countries and the median foreign subsidiary in both
groups have virtually no sovereign exposures, reflecting the fact that a banking group’s
securities portfolio is typically managed by the head bank.5
Figure 2 shows the pattern of median domestic sovereign exposures and loan–asset
ratios for stressed countries from July 2007 to February 2015; Figure 3 shows the corres-
ponding pattern for non-stressed countries. Besides confirming that domestic sovereign ex-
posures increased much more sharply in stressed countries, the figures illustrate the
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Figure 1. Median domestic sovereign exposure of head banks, domestic and foreign subsidiaries,
monthly values. Domestic sovereign exposure is the ratio of domestic sovereign debt holdings to
main assets (total assets less derivatives).
5 We are grateful to Rony Hamaui for pointing out this fact to us, based on his managerial experience
at Intesa Sanpaolo.
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completely different dynamics of the median bank’s loan-to-asset ratio. Figure 2 shows that
in stressed countries, loans to non-financial corporations are correlated negatively with sov-
ereign exposures: over the sample period, the median bank’s domestic exposure increases
from 1% to 6% of assets, while its corporate lending falls from 28% to about 20% of main
assets, the sharpest drop coming in the second half of 2012. In late 2014, the loan–asset
ratio begins to stabilize, in line with the improvement in aggregate lending in the stressed
countries. Figure 3 shows a completely different picture for the non-stressed countries: ex-
cept for the first 2 years of the sample, the loan–asset ratio of the median bank is positively
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Figure 2. Domestic sovereign exposure and loan–asset ratio of the median bank in stressed countries,
monthly values. Sovereign exposure is the ratio of domestic sovereign holdings to main assets; loan–
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correlated with its domestic sovereign exposures, and both variables have a distinct positive
trend.
Of course, these different correlations between sovereign exposures and bank lending at
the time-series, aggregate level do not, as such, establish causation: in principle, the nega-
tive correlation in stressed countries could reflect either the “crowding out” of private lend-
ing by sovereign debt in banks’ balance sheets or diminished demand for loans leading
banks to substitute them with sovereign debt. However, as we shall see, bank-level data
help to pin down the direction of causality, exploiting bank-level heterogeneity in the re-
sponse of sovereign exposures (Section 3) and of lending (Section 4) to sovereign stress.
3. Determinants of Banks’ Sovereign Exposures
The descriptive evidence set out above highlights the cross-sectional and time-series vari-
ation in banks’ domestic sovereign exposures. Some of this variation is accounted for by
three characteristics of the banks: fraction of public share ownership, government–bailout
history, and regulatory capital ratio. This section documents that these three characteristics
correlate not only with differences in sovereign exposures, but also with the way banks
vary their exposures when faced with domestic sovereign stress: public ownership, previous
occurrence of a bailout, and low capitalization are associated with a greater tendency to in-
crease holdings of distressed government debt in the face of a drop in its price.
As observed in Section 1, according to the “moral suasion” hypothesis, publicly owned
banks should be more willing than private ones to surrender to government influence and
purchase domestic debt at times of sovereign stress, and foreign banks should be less willing
than domestic ones to do so. By the same token, recently rescued banks should be more sen-
sitive to government pressure, their management being typically government-appointed and
keenly aware that their survival hinged on a public capital infusion. According to the “carry
trade” hypothesis, poorly capitalized banks should purchase more high-yield public debt to
gamble for resurrection. In the case of stressed-country banks, domestic debt is invariably
also high-yield debt, so that to distinguish between the two hypotheses heterogeneity across
banks is essential: indeed, we exploit the fact that at times of stress public and recently
bailed-out banks should be more inclined to buy domestic public debt, and undercapitalized
banks to buy more of it for yield-seeking motives.6 In this section, we show that each of
these hypotheses accounts for some of the variation of bank sovereign exposures in stressed
countries, and that the two groups of banks to which each hypothesis applies are distinct
and largely non-overlapping. Before turning to regression analysis, we provide some
graphic evidence to illustrate how changes in domestic sovereign exposures correlate with
bank characteristics.
Figure 4 shows banks’ domestic sovereign exposures according to the type of ownership:
the lines labeled “public” and “private”, respectively, plot the average exposures of banks
above and below the average fraction of public share ownership in the relevant country in
2008. The two vertical dashed lines in both panels of Figure 4 mark the timing of the two
6 In non-stressed countries, domestic debt obviously does not coincide with high-yield public debt,
so that for the banks of those countries one could test the “carry trade” hypothesis simply by
investigating whether they increase their holdings of foreign debt issued by stressed sovereigns.
However, our data do not provide a breakdown of foreign sovereign debt holdings by issuer, and
therefore prevent us from implementing this test for non-stressed-country banks.
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largest injections of liquidity by the ECB during the sovereign crisis, namely, the 3-year
very long-term refinancing operations (VLTROs) of December 2011 and March 2012,
which provided loans for e489 bn and e529 bn, respectively, to euro-area banks.7 In the
left panel, which refers to the stressed countries, the domestic sovereign exposures of the
two groups of banks are very similar until late 2011, but afterwards the banks with greater
public ownership increase their domestic sovereign exposures at a much faster pace than
the other group: the difference between them grows from nil in 2011 to over 6 percentage
points in 2015, consistently with the “moral suasion” hypothesis. The largest increase in
public banks’ sovereign exposures occurs in coincidence with the two VLTROs, suggesting
that these banks used the liquidity provided by the ECB to fund their purchases of domestic
public debt and/or bought such debt to pledge it as collateral to obtain liquidity, as found
by Crosignani, Faria-e-Castro, and Fonseca (2016) for Portuguese banks. The right panel
shows a qualitatively similar pattern in the domestic exposures of non-stressed countries’
banks as well, but with a much smaller difference between public and private banks—be-
tween 1 and 2 percentage points.
Figure 5 shows that in stressed countries, banks rescued with public funds purchased
substantially more domestic government debt in the month before and the year after it,
again consistently with the “moral suasion” hypothesis. The line plotted in the two panels
is the difference between the average domestic sovereign exposure of the bailed-out and the
other banks, measured in the same month and group of countries, over a 2-year window
centered on the bailout date (month 0). In stressed countries, the exposure of the bailed-out
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Figure 4. Domestic sovereign exposure and bank ownership, in stressed and non-stressed countries.
The line labeled “public” (private) plots the average monthly exposure of banks with a fraction of pub-
lic ownership above (below) the relevant country average in 2008.
7 More precisely, the settlement dates of the two operations were December 22, 2011, and March 1,
2012, respectively.
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banks rises on average 3 percentage points above that of the control group over the 12 sub-
sequent months. No such pattern is detectable in non-stressed countries.
Figure 6 explores whether banks with lower regulatory capital (Tier-1 capital scaled by
risk-weighted assets, or T1/RWA) increased high-yield sovereign holdings more than other
banks, consistently with the “carry trade” hypothesis. The left panel refers to stressed coun-
tries, the right panel to non-stressed ones. The figure is based on the subsample of banks for
which T1/RWA data are available in the SNL Financial database (SNL): between 30 and
40 banks in each group, depending on month. In each panel, the lines labeled “high T1/
RWA” and “low T1/RWA” refer to the average domestic sovereign exposure of banks with
above-median and below-median T1/RWA, respectively. After the 2010 Greek bailout, the
stressed-country banks with low capital ratios increased their sovereign exposures more
than their better-capitalized peers. Some difference, albeit smaller, is also observable in
non-stressed countries.
Taken together, the three figures suggest that stressed-country banks with more public
ownership and less regulatory capital increased their sovereign holdings more than other
banks at times of sovereign stress, and recently bailed-out banks bought more stressed do-
mestic debt than other banks. That is, this graphic evidence already suggests that both the
“moral suasion” and the “carry trade” hypotheses have some explanatory power.
Interestingly, the two hypotheses seem to apply to two quite different groups of stressed-
country banks: as of the end of 2008, only one of the “low T1/RWA” banks in Figure 6—
Monte dei Paschi di Siena—also features public ownership above its country median, and
therefore belongs to the group of “public” banks in Figure 4.
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Figure 5. Difference between the average domestic sovereign exposure of bailed-out and control
banks, in stressed and non-stressed countries. Control banks are not bailed-out ones. The difference
refers to values observed in the same month and the same group of countries. Month 0 is the bailout
date.
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To test these two hypotheses with regression analysis, we proceed in two steps. Since the
SNL data on T1/RWA—needed to test the “carry trade” hypothesis—are only available for
a subsample of banks, we first use the full sample to test the “moral suasion” hypothesis
only. Next, we restrict the estimation to the subsample for which we have SNL data and
test both hypotheses on this smaller sample.
In Table IV, we estimate the following specification:
DHijt
Hijt1
¼ ajt þ ci þ /1Publicijt 
DPjt
Pjt1
þ /2Publicijt  VLTROt þ /3Publicijt
þ/4Bailoutijt  VLTROt þ /5Bailoutijt þ /6Fij 
DPjt
Pjt1
þ/7Fij  VLTROt þ hXijt1 þ gijt;
(1)
where the dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in domestic sovereign
holdings Hijt of bank i in country j and quarter t (Holdings Hijt of debt issued by country j’s
government differ from exposure, which is defined as the ratio of holdings to main assets,
i.e., Hijt/Aijt). In Equation (1), Publicit is the time-varying fraction of the bank’s shares
owned directly or indirectly by local or national government or publicly controlled institu-
tions (Fondazioni in Italy, Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain, and Sparkasse and Landesbank
in Germany); DPjt=Pjt1 is the percentage change in the price of sovereign j’s debt in the pre-
vious quarter (computed as the product of the change in the relevant 10-year yield from t–1
to t by the corresponding duration as in De Marco, 2017); VLTROt equals 1 in coincidence
with the two ECB liquidity injections of December 2011 and March 2012, and 0 otherwise;
Bailoutijt equals 1 from the quarter in which bank i was bailed out (unless acquired by
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Figure 6. Domestic sovereign exposure and bank regulatory capital in stressed and non-stressed
countries, monthly values. The line labeled “High (Low) T1/RWA” refers to the average exposure of
banks with above-median (below-median) ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets.
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another bank in the two subsequent quarters), and 0 otherwise; Fij equals 1 if bank i is the
subsidiary of a foreign bank operating in country j and 0 if it is a domestic head bank or
subsidiary. The specification also includes bank-fixed effects ci to control for unobserved
heterogeneity at bank level and time-country effects ajt to control for country-level factors
that may affect bank purchases of sovereign debt, including government debt repricing: the
latter enters the specification only via its differential effect on banks with different charac-
teristics. Finally, we include the (lagged) deposit–liability ratio Xijt–1 as a further bank-level
control. In estimating specification (1), errors are clustered at the bank level, and the quar-
terly growth rates of sovereign holdings are trimmed at6100% to eliminate outliers.
At times of sovereign stress, the price of public debt falls; that is, the variable DPjt=Pjt1
is negative. The “moral suasion” hypothesis holds that at those times public banks should
buy more domestic debt than private ones, and foreign subsidiaries less than domestic
banks, so that /1< 0 and /6>0. Insofar as the ECB liquidity injections enabled public
banks to buy more domestic public debt than private and foreign ones, one would also ex-
pect /2> 0 and /7<0. The “moral suasion” hypothesis does not necessarily imply a posi-
tive direct effect of public ownership, /3: public banks are supposed to be more pliant at
times of sovereign stress, not to increase their public debt holdings more than other banks
at all times. Instead, the “moral suasion” hypothesis requires bailed-out banks to buy more
sovereign debt during and after their rescue, compared with other banks in the same coun-
try and quarter: /5> 0. Moreover, if ECB liquidity injections contributed to domestic pub-
lic debt purchases by bailed-out banks, one should find /4>0. Specification (1) merges
elements from the models of “moral suasion” estimated by De Marco and Macchiavelli
(2014); Acharya et al. (2015); Horvath, Huizinga, and Ioannidou (2015); and Ongena,
Popov, and van Horen (2016): the first three studies estimate regressions of sovereign ex-
posures on indicators of political control and government support using EBA stress test
data; the fourth focuses on measures of foreign ownership using IBSI data for stressed
countries.8
The estimates in Table IV show that for stressed countries the coefficient of the inter-
action between public ownership and the change of sovereign debt prices (/1) is negative
and significant, and the coefficients of the bailout variable (/5) and of the interaction be-
tween foreign ownership and sovereign price changes (/6) are both positive, although the
latter is imprecisely estimated: all these estimates conform to the predictions of the “moral
suasion” hypothesis. The estimate of /1 in Column 3 implies that, in response to a 1% de-
crease in domestic sovereign debt prices, a 100% publicly owned bank (Publicijt¼ 1)
increased its domestic sovereign holdings by 0.35% more than a 100% private bank
(Publicijt¼ 0); the estimate of /5 instead implies that bailed-out banks increase their public
debt holdings by 6.44% more than other banks. Moreover, the interaction of the VLTROt
dummy with public ownership has a positive and significant coefficient (/2), and that with
foreign ownership has a negative and significant one (/7): the 3-year ECB loans in 2011–12
allowed domestic public banks of stressed countries to purchase sovereign debt far in excess
of private and foreign banks. The estimates in Column 2 imply that in the two months of
the liquidity injections a 100% publicly owned bank increased its domestic debt holdings
8 The specification used by Ongena, Popov, and van Horen (2016) also relies on a different variable
to gauge sovereign stress, namely a measure of abnormally large domestic sovereign issuance
(high needs), which may induce the government to pressure domestic banks to underwrite larger
amounts of its debt.
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by 16.52% more than those of a 100% privately owned bank, in stressed countries. In con-
trast, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero in the non-stressed coun-
tries, except for /7, which is also negative and marginally significant. Since sovereign
solvency was seriously questioned by investors only for stressed countries, the results sup-
port the “moral suasion” hypothesis. They broadly agree with the results of De Marco and
Macchiavelli (2014) and Horvath, Huizinga, and Ioannidou (2015), but not with those of
Acharya et al. (2015), who find no evidence of “moral suasion”, nor with Ongena, Popov,
Table IV. Determinants of sovereign holdings: “moral suasion”
The dependent variable is the growth rate of banks’ domestic sovereign holdings in quarter t
(defined as the percentage difference between the end-of-period values in quarter t and quarter
t–1). The stressed countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. The non-
stressed countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, and the Netherlands.
DPjt=Pjt1 is sovereign debt repricing, defined as the percentage change of debt prices in coun-
try j and quarter t, based on 10-year benchmark yields. Publicijt is the fraction of banks’ shares
owned by local or national government or publicly controlled institutions (Fondazioni in Italy,
Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain, and Sparkasse and Landesbank in Germany). VLTRO equals 1
in December 2011 and March 2012, and 0 otherwise. Bailoutijt equals 1 starting in the quarter t
in which bank i in country j was bailed out (unless acquired in the two subsequent quarters),
and 0 before quarter t. Fij equals 1 if bank i in country j is a foreign subsidiary and 0 otherwise.
All the regressions include the bank-level (lagged) deposit–liability ratio as a further control.
The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level
and shown in parentheses: p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
Stressed countries Non-stressed countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Publicit  DPjtPjt1 0.37** 0.29** 0.35** 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Publicit  VLTRO 21.03*** 16.52*** 17.54*** 4.10 2.27 1.61
(6.04) (5.92) (5.72) (3.68) (3.95) (4.18)
Publicit 4.41 3.99 4.12 5.77 5.93 10.84
(5.25) (5.13) (6.37) (4.21) (4.14) (6.86)
Bailoutit  VLTRO 5.41 10.75
(5.11) (8.30)
Bailoutit 6.44** 8.02
(2.65) (6.03)
Fij  DPjtPjt1 0.19* 0.06
(0.11) (0.05)
Fij  VLTRO 11.98*** 6.83*
(4.29) (3.83)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only domestic No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.07
Banks 74 74 55 143 143 104
Observations 1892 1892 1401 3706 3706 2719
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and van Horen (2016), who find no significant interaction between the VLTRO and “moral
suasion”.
In Table V, we expand specification (1) to jointly test the “moral suasion” and the
“carry trade” hypothesis, allowing for their respective interactions with the ECB liquidity
injections:
DHijt
Hijt1
¼ ajt þ ci þ d1
T1
RWAijt1
 DPjt
Pjt1
þ d2 T1
RWAijt1
 VLTROt þ d3 T1
RWAijt1
þ
þd4Publicijt  DPjt
Pjt1
þ d5Publicijt  VLTROt þ d6Publicijt
þd7Bailoutijt  VLTROt þ d8Bailoutijt:
(2)
According to the “carry trade” hypothesis, weakly capitalized banks (low T1=RWAijt1)
should increase their sovereign holdings more than better capitalized ones when government
debt becomes cheaper (DPjt=Pjt1 < 0), and resell it more aggressively if and when prices re-
cover (DPjt=Pjt1 > 0) to realize their profits. Hence, the coefficient of the interaction between
T1=RWAijt1 and DPjt=Pjt1 should be positive: d1 > 0. Interestingly, the T1=RWAijt1 vari-
able has low correlation with Publicijt and Bailoutijt (0.15 and 0.18, respectively), confirming
that the group of poorly capitalized banks is quite distinct from the groups of public and re-
cently bailed-out banks. Specification (2) also allows us to test whether weakly capitalized
banks borrowed more from the ECB and used these loans to buy risky sovereign debt, as
found by Drechsler et al. (2016): this would require the coefficient of the interaction between
bank capitalization (T1=RWAijt1) and the VLTROt to be negative, that is, d2 < 0.
It is worth noticing that the “carry trade” hypothesis does not imply that poorly capital-
ized banks invariably purchase more domestic public debt (i.e., d3 < 0): if the price of do-
mestic sovereign debt is stable while that of distressed foreign sovereign debt declines, a
yield-seeking bank will bet on foreign sovereign debt, and divest domestic debt. In other
words, the hypothesis predicts an increasing home bias in sovereign debt portfolios only for
banks in stressed countries, not in non-stressed ones: during the crisis, a yield-seeking
German bank would not have invested in German but in Italian or Spanish public debt.
However, our data only provide a breakdown between domestic and foreign euro-area sov-
ereign debt holdings, and therefore they allow us to test the “carry trade” hypothesis only
for stressed countries: for the banks in non-stressed countries, such testing would require
the complete breakdown of their foreign debt portfolio (as in the studies of Buch, Koetter,
and Ohls (2016), on German banks and Peydro, Polo, and Sette (2017), on Italian banks).
Hence, we estimate Specification (2) only for stressed countries, where our data allow
meaningful estimation of the carry-trade coefficients d1, d2, and d3.
Specification (2) also includes the variables present in Specification (1) to capture
“moral suasion”, except for the interaction between foreign ownership and sovereign debt
repricing, since we have no data on the regulatory capital of foreign subsidiaries. The sam-
ple includes only the bank-quarter observations for which the SNL database supplies regu-
latory capital data. The panel is unbalanced, since there are data gaps even for some of the
forty-one banks included in the sample.
The estimates of Specification (2) are shown in Table V. The first two columns are for
the carry-trade variables only: the sample used in Column 1 includes all domestic banks,
while that in Column 2 includes head banks only (that hold most of their groups’ sovereign
debt). The estimate of d1 is positive and significant in both columns. Its estimate in Column
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2 implies that a 1% decrease in the price of domestic sovereign debt is associated with an
increase in sovereign holdings of about 1% for the median bank (which has a regulatory
capital ratio of 10%). The estimate of d3 is negative and marginally significant in Columns
2 and 3, implying that in stressed countries less capitalized banks increased their domestic
sovereign holdings more than better capitalized ones. Both estimated coefficients are
Table V. Determinants of sovereign holdings in stressed countries: “moral suasion” and “carry
trade”
The dependent variable is the growth rate of banks’ domestic sovereign holdings in quarter t
(defined as the percentage difference between the end-of-period values in quarter t and quarter
t–1). The stressed countries are Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.
DPjt=Pjt1 is the sovereign debt repricing, defined as the percentage change of government
bond prices in country j and quarter t, based on 10-year benchmark yields. T1=RWAijt1 is the
ratio of Tier-1 common equity to risk-weighted assets of bank i in country j and quarter t  1.
Publicijt is the fraction of banks’ shares owned by local or national government or publicly con-
trolled institutions (Fondazioni in Italy, Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain, and Sparkasse and
Landesbank in Germany). VLTRO equals 1 in December 2011 and March 2012, and 0 otherwise.
Bailoutijt equals 1 starting in the quarter t in which bank i in country j was bailed out (unless
acquired in the two subsequent quarters), and 0 before quarter t. Fij equals 1 if bank i in country
j is a foreign subsidiary and 0 otherwise. All the regressions include the bank-level (lagged) de-
posit–liability ratio as a further control. The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses: p < 0:01;
p < 0:05; p < 0:1:
Stressed countries
(1) (2) (3)
T1=RWAijt1  DPjtPjt1 7.60*** 10.22*** 11.36***
(2.57) (2.70) (3.24)
T1=RWAijt1  VLTRO 104.86 65.37 153.74
(176.82) (174.85) (142.24)
T1=RWAijt1 94.67 175.02* 190.03*
(94.00) (100.64) (100.28)
Publicit  DPjtPjt1 0.11
(0.24)
Publicit  VLTRO 28.24 **
(11.80)
Publicit 3.88
(5.71)
Bailoutit VLTRO 4.66
(5.74)
Bailoutit 4.76**
(2.31)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes
Only domestic No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.16 0.16
Banks 41 31 31
Observations 686 523 523
2120 C. Altavilla et al.
thus in agreement with the “carry trade” hypothesis. The estimate of d2 is negative but not
significantly different from zero in Columns 2 and 3, implying that in our data the ECB li-
quidity injections do not appear to have exacerbated carry trades by poorly capitalized
banks.
Column 3 shows the estimates for the complete specification (2), comprising both the
“carry trade” and the “moral suasion” terms, as well as the corresponding interactions
with the ECB liquidity injections of 2011–12, including only group head banks. Both
hypotheses are seen to have explanatory power, despite the limited size of this subsample.
The carry-trade coefficients d1 and d3 are virtually the same as in Column 2, and the coeffi-
cient d8 of the bailout variable and the coefficient d5 of the interaction between public own-
ership and the VLTROt both remain positive and significant, and similar in magnitude to
the corresponding estimates in Column 3 of Table IV – the only difference being that the
coefficient of the interaction between public ownership and sovereign debt repricing is no
longer significant, though positive. Indeed, a formal test shows that on the whole the “carry
trade” and the “moral suasion” variables have the same explanatory power.9 The main dif-
ference between them lies in their interaction with monetary policy: the ECB liquidity injec-
tion appears to have facilitated sovereign debt purchases by public banks rather than by
undercapitalized ones, that is, to have fed more into the “moral suasion” than the “carry
trade” channel—a finding that no previous study uncovered.
This novel finding is corroborated by the correlation between the change in banks’ do-
mestic sovereign holdings around the VLTRO dates and their liquidity take-up in the
VLTROs. As shown in Figure 7, in stressed countries this correlation was larger for public
banks than for private ones, the difference being statistically significant at the 2.8% level.
This confirms that sovereign debt purchases by public banks were fueled by the 3-year ECB
loans of the VLTROs more than those of private banks, in contrast with the findings of
Ongena, Popov, and van Horen (2016). Instead, no significant difference in this correlation
exists between banks with low and high T1/RWA ratio, as shown in Figure 8: in our data,
the ECB’s liquidity injections do not appear to have exacerbated carry trades by poorly cap-
italized banks compared with better capitalized ones, in contrast with the results reported
by Drechsler et al. (2016).10
9 To test whether there has been a predominance of one of the two hypotheses, we estimate
Specification (1)—for the banks for which SNL data on capital are available—first retaining only
the carry-trade variables and then retaining only the moral-suasion ones. We then perform the
likelihood ratio test proposed by Vuong (1989) and find that the null hypothesis that the two mod-
els have the same predictive power cannot be rejected (p-value¼ 0.8).
10 It is worth noticing that the evidence by Drechsler et al. (2016) on this point is more indirect than
ours, and is based on a different specification. They estimate a regression of changes in banks’
holdings of distressed sovereign debt on the amount of such debt pledged as collateral with the
ECB, and find a positive and significant association only for banks with low credit ratings, which
they take to be the less capitalized ones. Their interpretation is that weakly capitalized banks
used ECB loans to buy distressed sovereign debt. Our specification, instead, allow a direct test of
whether the banks with low T1/RWA ratio purchased more sovereign debt during the VLTROs than
banks with high T1/RWA ratio.
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To sum up the evidence so far, the descriptive statistics in Section 2 show great hetero-
geneity in banks’ sovereign exposures and in their changes over time. This section shows
that sovereign stress increased this heterogeneity, eliciting different responses from banks
with different characteristics. In the next section, we inquire whether such heterogeneity is
also associated with different responses of banks’ lending policies.
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Figure 8. Change in domestic sovereign holdings and VLTRO borrowing, for banks with low and high
regulatory capital in stressed countries. The figure plots the change in a bank’s domestic sovereign
holdings from November 2011 to March 2012 against its total VLTRO take-up as of March 2012. “Low
T1/RWA” (High T1/RWA) are banks with regulatory capital below (above) the median.
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Figure 7. Change in domestic sovereign holdings and VLTRO borrowing, for public and private banks in
stressed countries. The figure plots the change in a bank’s domestic sovereign holdings from November
2011 to March 2012 against its total VLTRO take-up as of March 2012, scaled by total assets. Public (pri-
vate) banks are those with public ownership fraction above (below) their country average.
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4. Sovereign Stress and Bank Lending
In this section, we investigate whether the response of banks’ lending to sovereign stress
was affected by their holdings of domestic public debt. As noted in Section 1, an increase in
sovereign risk may induce the more exposed banks to reduce corporate lending, owing to
larger capital losses from sovereign debt repricing. The resulting equity loss increases banks’
default risk and pushes them closer to their minimum prudential capital ratio, forcing the
weakest to deleverage. An increase in sovereign risk may also disproportionately raise the
funding costs of the more exposed banks, forcing them to contract lending. One can expect
a symmetric effect when banks’ sovereign holdings appreciate, as they did in the stressed
countries since mid-2012: in that case, the capital gains on sovereign holdings should amp-
lify the expansion of lending. Since sovereign holdings are a choice variable of banks, an
issue of endogeneity may arise in the estimate of this amplification effect. We use the empir-
ical analysis of the previous section to guide us in the choice of relevant instruments to ad-
dress this endogeneity concern.
Clearly, sovereign stress may also affect banks’ loans directly, for instance by inducing
banks to change their lending policies or by inducing firms to reduce their demand for
credit, quite apart from banks’ exposure to government debt: indeed, our specification will
control for this direct effect of sovereign stress. However, our focus will be on whether this
baseline effect is amplified for heavily exposed banks.
4.1 Bank Lending Regressions
To evaluate the impact of sovereign stress on bank lending, we estimate the following
specification:
DLijt
Lijt
¼ ajt þ ci þ b1 þ b2
DPjt1
Pjt2
 
Dij þ b3 þ b4
DPjt1
Pjt2
 
Fij
 
Expijt1 þ h0Xijt1 þ ijt;
(3)
where the dependent variable DLijt=Lijt is the quarterly growth of the loans granted by bank i
to non-financial corporations in country j and quarter t, and DPjt1=Pjt2 is the percentage
change in the price of sovereign j’s debt in the previous quarter. The reason for lagging the price
change in Equation (3) is to allow for a gradual response of lending to capital gains or losses
on the sovereign portfolio (although similar estimates are obtained using the contemporaneous
price change). The price Pjt of the sovereign debt of country j is alternatively the price of 10-
year and of 5-year government bonds, computed as the product of the change in the relevant
yield from t – 1 to t and the corresponding duration, as in De Marco (2017). In Specification
(3), the loans of domestic and foreign banks are allowed to respond differently to sovereign ex-
posures and capital gains or losses: Dij equals 1 if bank i in country j is domestic and 0 other-
wise, and Fij ¼ 1 Dij. The bank-level controls Xijt1 in Equation (3) are the lagged leverage
ratio and deposit–liability ratio, and their interactions with the sovereign debt repricing
DPjt1=Pjt2, to control for the differential effect that such repricing may have on banks differ-
ing in solvency risk. In estimating Specification (3), errors are clustered at the bank level, and
the quarterly growth rates of loans are trimmed at6100% to eliminate outliers.11
11 In the estimation of this specification, we also take into account two breaks in the time series of
loans of four Spanish banks (BFA-Bankia, Catalunya Banc, NGC Banco-Banco Gallego, and
Banco de Valencia), in November 2012 and January 2013. These breaks are due to restructuring
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Table VI shows the estimates of Specification (3) for the stressed countries. In panel A,
Columns 1–3 show the estimates obtained when sovereign debt repricing is computed
from the yields of 10-year benchmark bonds; Columns 4–6 relate to 5-year yields. In each
case, we start from a specification where domestic and foreign banks are constrained to
have the same coefficients (Columns 1 and 4), then expand that specification with bank-
level controls (Columns 2 and 5), and finally estimate a specification where domestic and
foreign banks are allowed to have different coefficients and bank-level controls are
included.
In all these specifications, the estimate of b2 is positive and significantly different from
zero, indicating that in stressed countries the domestic banks more exposed to the sovereign
responded to public debt repricing by cutting lending more sharply than the less exposed
ones; and conversely they expanded their lending more in response to a rise in public debt
prices. In contrast, the estimate of b4 is small and not significantly different from zero,
implying that foreign banks with different exposures to their host country’s debt did not re-
spond differently to its repricing, probably because the subsidiaries of foreign banks operat-
ing in stressed countries had very little exposure to the host country sovereign debt (see
Figure 1).
Panel B of Table VI reports the estimates of two specifications where we control for
this feature of the data. Since the sovereign portfolio of a banking group is likely to be
concentrated at the level of the group head, subsidiaries of domestic banks hold little sov-
ereign debt, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, lending should react only to the value of sover-
eign debt holdings of the head bank. Panel B of Table VI inquires into this in two
different ways. First, we estimate a specification similar to Equation (3) using only data
for heads of domestic groups, with sovereign repricing based on 10-year yields in Column
1, and 5-year yields in Column 3. In both cases, the estimate of the interaction coefficient
b2 using only data for head banks is considerably higher than that obtained in Panel A
using all banks. The coefficient rises from 1.40 to 2.48 using 10-year debt repricing, and
from 0.97 to 1.96 using 5-year debt repricing, and the explanatory power of the regres-
sion increases slightly even though the number of observations drops by 42%. Next, in
Columns 2 and 4 of Panel B, instead of dropping subsidiaries from the sample, we re-
estimate the regression by imputing to domestic subsidiaries the sovereign exposures of
their respective parent banks, since subsidiaries’ lending decisions may be affected by the
capital gains or losses on the securities held by their parent banks. Again the estimate of
b2 exceeds that obtained in Panel A: 2.08 using 10-year debt repricing, and 1.96 using 5-
year debt repricing. Hence, the amplification effect is indeed associated with the sover-
eign exposure of the relevant head bank.
The economic significance of the estimates shown in Table VI is considerable: they
imply that in stressed countries a 1-standard-deviation drop in the price of 10-year gov-
ernment bonds (–17%) reduces the loan growth of the median domestic bank by 0.7 per-
centage points and that of the median domestic head bank by 1.4 percentage points.
and recapitalization by SAREB, the “bad bank” set up by the government to manage the assets
transferred by these four banks. To remove the breaks, we regress the loans for these banks on
dummy variables corresponding to the two breaks and replace the actual values with the re-
siduals obtained from this regression. We use the same approach to deal with a break for the
Slovenian bank Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor in December 2013, when it transferred its bad loans
to the Slovenian bad bank.
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Table VI. Lending and sovereign exposures in stressed countries
The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans by bank i to non-financial companies in
quarter t in stressed country j (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). DPjt1=Pjt2 is the
sovereign debt repricing, defined as the percentage change of government bond prices in coun-
try j and quarter t–1, based on 10-year yields in Columns 1 3 of Panel A and Columns 1–2 of
Panel B, and on 5-year yields in Columns 4–6 of Panel A and Columns 3–4 of Panel B. Expijt1 is
the domestic sovereign exposure of bank i in country j and quarter t–1. Exp:Headiht1 is the in-
direct exposure of the head bank of subsidiary i operating in country j to the sovereign risk of
its home country h 6¼ j , and is set to zero if bank i is a domestic bank of country j, that is, if h ¼ j.
Dij equals 1 if bank i in country j is domestic and 0 otherwise, and Fij ¼ 1  Dij . The controls are
the bank-level (lagged) capital–asset ratio and the lagged deposit–liability ratio, and their inter-
actions with sovereign debt repricing. The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses:
p < 0:01; p < 0:05;p < 0:1:
Panel A: Domestic and foreign banks
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPjt1
Pjt2
 Expijt1 1:38 1:39 0:97 0:97
ð0:52Þ ð0:52Þ ð0:43Þ ð0:44Þ
Dij  DPjt1Pjt2  Expijt1 1:45
 1:03
ð0:52Þ ð0:46Þ
Fij  DPjt1Pjt2  Expijt1 –0.50 –0.20
ð0:80Þ ð0:54Þ
Expijt1 10.49 12.08 4.28 6.11
ð13:68Þ ð13:87Þ ð14:64Þ ð14:49Þ
Dij  Expijt1 19.36 12.61
ð14:96Þ ð17:14Þ
Fij  Expijt1 –41.52 –41.39
ð28:09Þ ð26:58Þ
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Banks 74 74 74 68 68 68
Observations 1921 1897 1897 1756 1732 1732
Panel B: Domestic banks, using only head banks or imputing their exposures to subsidiaries
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPjt1
Pjt2
 Expijt1 2:45 1:96
(0.98) (0.91)
Expijt1 16.35 5.07
(16.84) (16.99)
(continued)
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These account, respectively, for 9.7% and 20% of the standard deviation of loan growth
(12.7% and 12.2%). Comparable figures are obtained for the effect of the repricing of 5-
year government bonds: in that case the amplification effect accounts for 10.1% of the
standard deviation of the loan growth of domestic banks and for 23.3% of that of domes-
tic head banks.12
Another way to assess the magnitude of this amplification mechanism is to compute the
loan growth associated with the change in the value of banks’ sovereign holdings over the
sample period. Figure 9 plots the cumulated component (dashed line) of the loan growth
rate predicted by the interaction term (relying on the estimated coefficient of 2.45, reported
in Column 1 of Table VI, Panel B), averaged across the banks operating in stressed coun-
tries. The figure also plots actual average loans (solid line) as a benchmark to gauge how
far the interaction of bank exposures and sovereign stress helps explain the actual dynamics
of lending. The interaction effect is virtually nil until mid-2010, but becomes negative and
increasingly large after the Greek bailout in that year (marked by the first vertical line), ac-
counting for the entire drop in lending by the average bank in stressed countries between
mid-2010 and mid-2012. After Draghi’s “whatever-it-takes” speech in 2012 (the second
vertical line), the interaction effect turns positive and rising. Hence, the interaction effect
Table VI. Continued
Panel B: Domestic banks, using only head banks or imputing their exposures to subsidiaries
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPjt1
Pjt2
 Exp:Headijt1 2:05 1:96
(0.79) (0.78)
Exp:Headijt1 25.12 12.81
(17.51) (16.91)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidiary No Yes No Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.13
Banks 42 53 38 47
Observations 1115 1345 1004 1187
12 The effect of a 1-standard-deviation rise in the price of 10-year bonds on domestic bank lending is
obtained by multiplying its standard deviation (0.17) by the estimate of b2 in Column 3 of Panel A
of Table VI (1.45) and by the median domestic bank’s sovereign exposure (0.05), that is,
0:17 1:45 0:05 ¼ 0:012. Similarly, for domestic head banks we multiply the estimate of b2 in
Column 1 of Panel B of Table VI (2.45) by the median domestic head bank’s exposure (5.8%), that
is, 0:17 2:45 0:058 ¼ 0:024. The calculation can be repeated for 5-year bonds taking into ac-
count that the standard deviation of their price changes is 0.25, and using the estimates of b2 in
Column 6 of Panel A (1.03) for all domestic banks and in Column 3 of Panel B (1.96) for domestic
head banks.
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due to sovereign exposures amplifies the fluctuations in loan growth during most of the
sample period.
The results reported in Table VI are qualitatively confirmed also when the same specifi-
cations are re-estimated for household loans (not reported for brevity). In the case of house-
hold loans, the amplification effect of sovereign exposures is considerably smaller than for
corporate lending: typically, the estimate of the interaction coefficient b2 is one-third of the
size reported in Table VI. Hence, banks suffering larger losses on their public debt holdings
cut back their household loans considerably less than their loans to firms. This “pecking
order” may reflect the lower riskiness of household loans, which are generally collateralized
by real estate and carry lower prudential risk weights; but it may also reflect the fact that
loans to firms have typically shorter maturity than housing mortgages, and thus can be
reduced more easily by not rolling them over.
In Table VII the specifications of Table VI are re-estimated for non-stressed countries:
the amplification coefficient b2 is not significantly different from zero for domestic banks,
whereas it is positive and significant for foreign banks (Columns 3 and 6 of Panel A); this
also explains why it is weakly significant when domestic and foreign banks are pooled to-
gether (Columns 4 and 5 of Panel A). Hence, the loans of foreign subsidiaries respond to
capital gains or losses on holdings of their host government’s debt. This can be explained
recalling that these foreign banks are mostly subsidiaries of stressed-country banks, which
are more sensitive to the valuation of their securities than banks of non-stressed countries,
being more severely equity-constrained.
In summary, the evidence in this section shows that banks’ sovereign exposures ampli-
fied the impact of sovereign stress on bank lending. In fact, this amplification effect extends
to banks’ interest rate policy and to their solvency risk, as documented in the working paper
version of the present study (Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2016). In stressed countries,
-
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Figure 9. Actual bank lending and estimated amplification effect in stressed countries. The solid line
plots actual average loans. The dashed line is the cumulated component of the loan growth rate pre-
dicted by the interaction term (2:45  DPjt1=Pjt2  Expijt1), averaged across banks in stressed
countries.
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Table VII. Lending and sovereign exposures in non-stressed countries
The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans by bank i to non-financial companies in
quarter t in non-stressed country j (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia). DPjt1=Pjt2 is the sovereign debt repricing,
defined as the percentage change of government bond prices in country j and quarter t–1,
based on 10-year yields in Columns 1–3 of Panel A and Columns 1–2 of Panel B, and on 5-year
yields in Columns 4–6 of Panel A and Columns 3–4 of Panel B. Expijt1 is the domestic sover-
eign exposure of bank i in country j and quarter t–1. Exp:Headiht1 is the indirect exposure of
the head bank of subsidiary i operating in country j to the sovereign risk of its home country
h 6¼ j , and is set to zero if bank i is a domestic bank of country j, that is, if h ¼ j . Dij equals 1 if
bank i in country j is domestic and 0 otherwise, and Fij ¼ 1  Dij . The controls are the bank-level
(lagged) capital–asset ratio and the lagged deposit–liability ratio, and their interactions with
sovereign debt repricing. The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses: p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1:
Panel A: Domestic and foreign banks
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DPjt1
Pjt2
 Expijt1 0.32 0.34 0:30 0:29
ð0:37Þ ð0:34Þ ð0:18Þ ð0:17Þ
Dij  DPjt1Pjt2  Expijt1 0.02 0.06
ð0:57Þ ð0:27Þ
Fij  DPjt1Pjt2  Expijt1 0:55
 0:43
ð0:24Þ ð0:10Þ
Expijt1 –9.91 –13.49 –14.08 –17.48
ð13:43Þ ð13:33Þ ð14:27Þ ð14:14Þ
Dij  Expijt1 –10.50 –12.12
ð14:09Þ ð14:48Þ
Fij  Expijt1 –17.94 –24.27
ð29:07Þ ð29:33Þ
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Banks 147 146 146 143 142 142
Observations 3923 3888 3888 3859 3826 3826
Panel B: Domestic banks, using only head banks or imputing their exposures to subsidiaries
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPjt1
Pjt2
 Expijt1 0.96 0.46
ð0:87Þ ð0:40Þ
(continued)
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more exposed banks raised their loan rates more in response to sovereign stress, and
decreased them more once stress abated. Moreover, sovereign exposures amplified the
transmission of risk from governments to banks: in stressed countries, the CDS premia of
more exposed banks were more correlated with the CDS premia of domestic sovereign debt
than the CDS premia of less exposed banks.
4.1.a. Endogeneity
The estimates in Tables VI and VII might be biased and inconsistent due to endogeneity
problems. First, they may be driven by omitted variables, in particular those capturing the
role of the demand for credit. At times of sovereign stress, firms may cut back on invest-
ment, and thus reduce their loan demand. This could engender spurious correlation if banks
with larger sovereign exposures happen to have customers whose business is more sensitive
to sovereign stress, so that when public debt prices fall sharply they suffer a larger drop in
loan demand by their customers. Second, the results could be driven by reverse causality if
the banks that face a larger drop in loan demand (due to the composition of their customer
base) substitute public debt for loans in their asset base: if so, causality would run from the
change in corporate loan demand to banks’ sovereign debt holdings.
To address the issue of omitted variables, we investigate how lending by foreign subsid-
iaries of stressed-country banks operating in non-stressed countries responds to the repric-
ing of the sovereign portfolio of their head bank. The idea is that the repricing of sovereign
debt in stressed countries was external to the credit markets of non-stressed countries, and
thus it can be viewed as an exogenous shock to loan supply in the latter, along the lines of
Peek and Rosengren (2000); Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002); Chava and Purnanandam
(2011); Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011) and Schnabl (2012). The domestic sovereign
Table VII. Continued
Panel B: Domestic banks, using only head banks or imputing their exposures to subsidiaries
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expijt1 –23.81 26:70
ð16:52Þ ð17:84Þ
DPjt1
Pjt2
 Exp:Headijt1 0.75 0.38
ð0:80Þ ð0:38Þ
Exp:Headijt1 –21.66 –24.23
ð14:98Þ ð16:27Þ
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidiary Yes No Yes No
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.10
Banks 73 104 72 103
Observations 1992 2771 1976 2755
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exposures of head banks in stressed countries should amplify the shock to their foreign sub-
sidiaries’ lending: for example, the loans granted by Italian banks operating in Germany
should respond to the depreciation of Italian sovereign debt to an extent that depends on
the Italian sovereign holdings of their parent bank in Italy. This change in lending should
not be affected by spurious correlation, as corporate loan demand in Germany should not
respond to sovereign stress in Italy.13
Hence, we estimate the following specification:
DLijt
Lijt
¼ ajt þ ci þ b1 þ b2
DPht1
Pht2
 
Exp:Headijt1 þ h0Xijt1 þ ijt; (4)
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of loans by bank i to non-financial corpor-
ations in non-stressed country j. The index h denotes the bank’s “home” country: bank i
may be either a domestic country-j bank (in which case h¼ j) or the foreign subsidiary of a
bank based in stressed country h (in which case h 6¼ j). The sample comprises subsidiaries of
banks based in Italy and Spain that operate in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg,
and Slovakia, as well as domestic banks based in these countries. DPht1=Pht1 measures
the price change of the sovereign debt of the home country h 6¼ j in quarter t–1. Exp.Headiht
is the indirect exposure of subsidiary i operating in country j to the sovereign risk of its
home country h 6¼ j (i.e., the domestic exposure of the subsidiary’s parent bank), and is set
to zero if bank i is a domestic bank of country j, that is, if h¼ j. The bank-level controls
Xijt1 are Expijt1 and DPjt1=Pjt2  Expijt1, where Expijt1 is the direct exposure of
bank i (whether domestic or subsidiary of a foreign bank) operating in country j to the sov-
ereign debt of country j in quarter t–1: these variables control for the effect of exposure to
the “host” country’s sovereign risk and the effect of its repricing on bank i’s lending.
The results for this specification are shown in Table VIII, where debt price changes refer
to 10-year debt in Columns 1–2 and to 5-year debt in Columns 3–4, either without or with
bank-level controls. In all cases, the estimate of the amplification coefficient b2 is positive,
significant, and comparable to that estimated in Panel B of Table VI for the loan growth of
the head banks: when price changes refer to 10-year debt, b2 is estimated to be 3.26 for
“lending abroad” by stressed-country subsidiaries in Table VIII and 2.48 for “lending at
home” by the corresponding head banks in Table VI; the estimates are even closer for 5-
year debt, b2 being 1.71 for “lending abroad” by subsidiaries in Table VIII, and 1.96 for
“lending at home” by head banks in Table VI.
Hence, the response of loans granted abroad by subsidiaries of stressed-country banks
to the repricing of the home country debt held by their head banks is very similar to the re-
sponse of the domestic loans of those head banks themselves. This indicates that the ampli-
fication coefficients estimated in Table VI capture a shift in bank loan supply and not a
shift in firms’ loan demand.
A second endogeneity concern is that lending itself may affect the size of lagged sover-
eign exposures, generating reverse causality: for instance, banks with larger sovereign hold-
ings may have clients whose solvency is particularly sensitive to sovereign risk, and
therefore may substitute lending with public debt at times of sovereign stress. If so,
13 Bofondi, Carpinelli, and Sette (2013) adopt a symmetric strategy to identify the effect of sovereign
stress on the supply of loans in Italy: they compare the loans extended by Italian and foreign
banks to the same customers in Italy, and show that during the sovereign crisis Italian banks
reduced their lending by more than foreign ones.
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would over-estimate the amplification of the drop in lending
due to sovereign exposures. In principle the bias may go in the opposite direction: if at times
of sovereign stress banks want to reduce corporate lending, they need less collateral to bor-
row from the central bank or the interbank money market, and therefore may also reduce
their sovereign holdings. Whatever its direction, the bias should be attenuated by the fact
that in our specification the sovereign exposure of bank i is measured one quarter before its
loan growth. However, in principle banks could change their sovereign holdings in antici-
pation of future changes in loan growth. In this case, rather than measuring the extent to
which losses or gains on sovereign holdings impact lending, the estimates might be captur-
ing how expected changes in lending impact sovereign exposures.
To address this potential reverse causality, recall the evidence in Section 3 that publicly
owned banks increase their domestic sovereign holdings more than privately owned banks
in response to sovereign stress, and that bailouts are followed by increases in domestic sov-
ereign holdings. This suggests that these two variables—public ownership and occurrence
of a bank bailout, both interacted with sovereign repricing—are relevant instruments of the
interaction term Expijt1  DPjt1=Pjt2 in our specification. For the variables Publicijt1
DPjt1=Pjt2 and Bailoutijt1  DPjt1=Pjt2 to be also valid instruments, they must satisfy
Table VIII. Lending by stressed-country subsidiaries operating in non-stressed countries
The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans to non-financial companies issued by bank i
based in country h (the “home” country) operating in non-stressed country j. Bank i may be ei-
ther a domestic country j bank (in which case j ¼ h) or the subsidiary of a bank based in
stressed country h (in which case j 6¼ h). The stressed countries are Italy and Spain; the non-
stressed countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. DPht1=Pht2
measures the repricing of sovereign debt of the home country h 6¼ j in quarter t–1, based on 10-
year yields in Columns 1–2, and on 5-year yields in Columns 3–4. Exp:Headiht is the indirect ex-
posure of the head bank of subsidiary i operating in country j to the sovereign risk of its home
country h 6¼ j , and is set to zero if bank i is a domestic bank of country j, that is, if h ¼ j . The
bank-level controls are Expijt1 and DPjt1=Pjt2  Expijt1, where Expijt1 is the exposure of
bank i (whether domestic or a subsidiary of a foreign bank) operating in country j to the sover-
eign debt of host country j in quarter t–1. The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses: p < 0:01;
  p < 0:05;p < 0:1.
10-year debt repricing 5-year debt repricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPht1
Pht2
 Exp:Headiht1 3:26 3:34 1:71 1:76
ð1:32Þ ð1:36Þ ð0:70Þ ð0:72Þ
Exp:Headiht1 –72.28 –74.25 –70.84 –72.88
ð49:72Þ ð50:55Þ ð47:42Þ ð48:19Þ
Controls No Yes No Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Banks 82 82 82 82
Observations 2278 2278 2278 2278
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the exclusion restriction that lending by publicly owned and bailed-out banks does not react
differently to sovereign stress compared with lending by other banks, unless they have dif-
ferent domestic sovereign exposures. In other words, their exposure must be the only factor
determining their differential response to sovereign stress. This exclusion restriction would
be violated if at times of sovereign stress the customers of public and recently rescued banks
were to become comparatively riskier, so that these banks would be more inclined to curtail
lending than other banks. To verify whether this is the case, we estimate an auxiliary
regression whose dependent variable is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans, based on
SNL data for thirty-five banks in stressed countries and forty-three banks in non-stressed
ones. The explanatory variables include the Bailoutijt1 and Publicijt1 variables, and
their interactions with DPjt1=Pjt2. The estimates (shown in Table AII in the Appendix) in-
dicate that the coefficients of the two instruments (Publicijt1  DPjt1=Pjt2 and
Bailoutijt1  DPjt1=Pjt2) are not significantly different from zero: at times of sovereign
stress, the fraction of impaired loans does not tend to increase more for public and recently
bailed-out banks, which lends credibility to the exclusion restriction made in Table IX.
Table IX. Lending and sovereign exposures of domestic banks: IV estimates
The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans by domestic banks to non-financial compa-
nies in quarter t in stressed countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). DP 10jt1=P
10
jt2
and DP 5jt1=P
5
jt2 measure the percentage change of government bond prices in country j and
quarter t–1, respectively, for 10-year and 5-year debt. Expijt1 is the domestic sovereign expos-
ure of domestic bank i in country j and quarter t–1, defined as the ratio of sovereign debt hold-
ings to main assets. The controls are the bank-level (lagged) capital–asset ratio and the lagged
deposit–liability ratio, and their interactions with sovereign debt repricing. All regressions in
this table are estimated by IV, using Bailoutijt1  DPjt1=Pjt2 and Publicijt  DPjt1=Pjt2 as in-
struments for Expijt1  DPjt1=Pjt2. Bailoutijt equals 1 starting in the quarter t in which bank i
in country j was bailed out (unless acquired in the two subsequent quarters), and 0 before quar-
ter t. Publicijt is the fraction of banks’ shares owned by local or national government or publicly
controlled institutions (Fondazioni in Italy, Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain, and Sparkasse and
Landesbank in Germany). The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses: p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
Stressed countries Non-stressed countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expijt1 
DP10
jt1
P10
jt2
3:65 –1.43
ð1:42Þ ð2:95Þ
Expijt1 
DP5
jt1
P5
jt2
3:46 0.04
ð1:90Þ ð1:05Þ
Expijt1 4.25 –30.21 –0.90 –11.85
ð20:34Þ ð39:64Þ ð20:54Þ ð18:48Þ
Banks 54 48 104 104
First-stage F-test 17 34 2 3
Observations 1396 1238 2822 2819
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Table IX shows the IV estimates of Specification (3), restricted to domestic banks (i.e.,
setting Dij¼ 1 and Fij¼ 0), as obviously there are no domestic bailouts of foreign banks.
For stressed countries the estimate of b2 is still positive and significant, while for non-
stressed countries it is still not significantly different from zero. Indeed, the IV estimate of
b2 for stressed countries exceeds its OLS counterpart: the endogeneity bias appears to lead
to an underestimate of the amplification mechanism. For stressed-country banks, the F-stat-
istics testing the power of the instruments are 17 and 34 in the regressions based on 10-year
and 5-year bond prices, respectively. Beside addressing endogeneity concerns, these IV esti-
mates have a substantive implication: they show that the amplification of shocks to lending
due to domestic sovereign exposures can be traced back to the moral suasion exerted by
governments on banks during the crisis.
In summary, the evidence indicates that neither omitted variables nor reverse causality
are serious concerns for the estimates shown in previous tables.
4.1.b. Unexpected sovereign repricing
The foregoing estimates show that in stressed countries bank loans dropped in response to
the depreciation of sovereign debt and rose in response to its appreciation, in proportion
to the relevant bank’s exposure. Insofar as these price changes are anticipated, however,
banks will switch in advance from corporate loans to sovereign debt; that is, they can be ex-
pected to buy sovereign debt when its price is unusually low—an effect that is indeed docu-
mented in Section 3. In this case, the estimate of b2 would conflate the impact of the
appreciation of given sovereign exposures and that of the concomitant response of expos-
ures to the expected appreciation. In order to study the first of these two effects by itself,
the previous specification is re-estimated replacing sovereign debt repricing with its unex-
pected component.
We have data on survey-based consensus forecasts of 10-year yields (YEjt ) for Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain, so for these five countries we can compute time
series of “yield surprises”, ðYjt  YEjt Þ=Yjt1. Since these surprises cannot be transformed
into unexpected price changes owing to the non-linearity of the price–yield relationship, in
Table X we estimate a variant of Specification (3) in which the change in the price of sover-
eign debt DPjt1=Pjt2 is replaced by yield surprises. The interaction between domestic yield
surprises ðYjt  YEjt Þ=Yjt1 and a bank’s domestic exposure Expijt measures the bank’s cap-
ital loss from the unexpected repricing of its domestic sovereign holdings. Notice that as
the repricing is unanticipated, the bank cannot have modified its sovereign holdings to take
advantage of it. To take into account that banks may adjust their lending policy to such an
unexpected capital loss with a delay, in the regression this interaction variable is lagged by
one quarter with respect to the bank’s loan growth, as with the analogous interaction vari-
ables in previous specifications.
The estimates in the first three columns of Table X refer to stressed countries. In
Columns 1 and 2, domestic and foreign banks are pooled: the two specifications differ by
the absence or presence of bank-level controls, that is, the (lagged) capital–asset ratio, the
lagged deposit–liability ratio, and their interactions with sovereign yield surprises. In
Column 3, as in the previous tables, the estimates are allowed to differ between domestic
and foreign banks. Columns 4–6 show the estimates of the same specifications for banks
operating in non-stressed countries. On the whole, the results confirm those of the previous
tables, based on the realized repricing of domestic sovereign debt: the estimated coefficient
of the interaction term is negative (as expected) and significant for stressed-country banks
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but not for those in non-stressed countries. Further, it is considerably larger and more pre-
cisely estimated for domestic banks than for foreign ones operating in stressed countries.
The main difference with respect to the previous results is that the coefficient estimate is
non-negligible and significantly different from zero at the 10% level also for foreign banks
operating in stressed countries: despite their limited exposure to their host countries’ sover-
eign risk, these banks too appear to have reacted to unexpected losses and gains on their
holdings of local sovereign debt.
5. Conclusions
Exploiting the substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in individual banks’ do-
mestic sovereign exposures, this paper jointly addresses two questions that various recent
studies of the euro-area crisis have attacked separately. First, did banks with different
Table X. Lending, sovereign exposures, and yield surprises
The dependent variable is the growth rate of loans by bank i to non-financial companies in
country j and quarter t. The stressed countries are Italy and Spain. The non-stressed countries
are France, Germany, and the Netherlands. ðYjt  YEjt Þ=Yjt1 is the unexpected percentage
change (surprise) in the domestic 10-year benchmark sovereign yield in quarter t, computed as
the average of the three monthly surprises in quarter t. Expijt is the domestic sovereign expos-
ure of bank i in country j and quarter t, defined as the ratio of sovereign debt holdings to main
assets. Dij equals 1 if bank i in country j is domestic and 0 otherwise, and Fij ¼ 1  Dij . The con-
trols are the bank-level (lagged) capital–asset ratio and the lagged deposit–liability ratio, and
their interactions with sovereign yield surprises. The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses: p < 0:01;
p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
Stressed countries Non-stressed countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yjt1YEjt1
Yjt2
 Expijt1 1:85 1:83 0:22 –0.11
ð0:75Þ ð0:77Þ ð0:42Þ ð0:35Þ
Dij  Yjt1Y
E
jt1
Yjt2
 Expijt1 1:89 0.04
ð0:88Þ ð0:36Þ
Fij  Yjt1Y
E
jt1
Yjt2
 Expijt1 1:07 –1.58
ð0:62Þ ð1:37Þ
Expijt1 –2.09 –0.51 –15.79 19:99
ð14:03Þ ð13:85Þ ð12:92Þ ð11:90Þ
Dij  Expijt1 3.42 21:37
ð17:60Þ ð12:38Þ
Fij  Expijt1 –28.62 17.00
ð26:09Þ ð29:35Þ
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10
Banks 47 47 47 102 101 101
Observations 1195 1190 1190 2742 2709 2709
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characteristics change their public debt holdings differently in response to sovereign stress
and to its abatement after 2012? Second, were larger sovereign exposures associated with
more forceful transmission of sovereign stress to banks’ lending policies, and was such an
amplification causally related to banks’ sovereign exposures? The two questions are clearly
related, since sovereign holdings and lending are jointly chosen by banks. Indeed, studying
them together allows us to build on our analysis of the determination of sovereign expos-
ures to identify relevant instruments to address endogeneity in our lending regressions.
Our findings answer both of the above questions in the affirmative. First, in stressed
euro-area countries, publicly owned and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to sovereign
stress by increasing their holdings of domestic public debt more than other banks, which
suggests that their portfolio choices were influenced both by government’s moral sua-
sion and by their own search for yield. Domestic public debt purchases by public banks
in stressed countries were also facilitated by the ECB’s 3-year refinancing operations of
2011–12.
Second, banks’ domestic sovereign exposures in the stressed countries were associated
with a statistically significant and economically relevant amplification of sovereign stress
transmission to corporate lending, which cannot be attributed to spurious correlation or re-
verse causality. Indeed, this amplification effect of sovereign stress also spills over abroad:
the repricing of sovereign debt in stressed countries induced the subsidiaries of stressed-
country banking groups to reduce lending in non-stressed countries. Altogether, this evi-
dence connects the amplification effect of sovereign exposures and its cross-border trans-
mission with the “moral suasion” exerted by domestic governments on banks during the
crisis.
These findings are important for banking regulation: currently, euro-area prudential
regulation gives strong preferential treatment to sovereign debt over bank loans, treating it
as risk-free for purposes of capital charges and imposing no concentration limit on hold-
ings. This encourages banks to invest in high-yield sovereign debt rather than lending to
firms and households and, as shown in this paper, strengthens the impact of sovereign stress
on lending. To make matters worse, in the euro-area countries affected by sovereign stress
during the crisis, banks’ domestic sovereign exposures have remained considerably larger
than they were at the inception of the crisis: between 2013 and 2017, the domestic exposure
of the median bank in these countries has been about three times as large as it was in early
2010. This raises the concern that a future resurgence of sovereign stress—possibly in con-
nection with tapering of large-scale asset purchases by the ECB—might trigger commensur-
ately larger effects on bank lending.
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Appendix
Table AI. List of variables, definitions, and sources
Variable Symbol Definition Source Units
Ownership Publicij Fraction of bank equity held in coun-
try j and quarter t by local or na-
tional government or by publicly
controlled institutions (Fondazioni
in Italy, Fundaciones and Cajas in
Spain, and Sparkasse and
Landesbank in Germany).
Bankscope and
authors’
calculations
Sovereign debt
price change
DPjt=Pjt1 Percentage change of 10- or 5-year
debt prices in country j and quar-
ter t.
Datastream and
authors’
calculations
Foreign subsidiary
dummy
Fij Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank i
in country j is a foreign subsidiary
and 0 otherwise.
ECB
Bailout dummy Bailoutijt Dummy variable equal to 1 starting
in the quarter t in which bank i in
country j was bailed out (unless
acquired in the two subsequent
quarters), and 0 before t.
EU Commission—
State Aid
Database
Sovereign holding
growth rate
Sovereign
holding
growth
Percentage growth rate of banks’
sovereign holdings in quarter t.
IBSI–ECB and au-
thors’
calculations
Tier-1 common
equity over
risk-weighted
assets
T1=RWAijt1 Ratio between Tier-1 common
equity and risk-weighted assets of
bank i in country j and quarter
t–1.
SNL
Domestic sover-
eign exposures
Expijt Ratio between domestic sovereign
debt holdings and main assets
(total assets minus derivatives) of
bank i in country j and quarter
t–1.
IBSI–ECB
Domestic dummy Dij Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank i
in country j is domestic and 0
otherwise.
ECB
10-year govern-
ment yield
Yjt 10-year benchmark government
bond yield in country j and
quarter t
Datastream
10-year govern-
ment yield
forecast
YEjt Consensus estimate of the 10-year
government yield of country j for
quarter t made by professional
forecasters at the end of quarter
t–1.
Consensus
economics
Surprise in sover-
eign yield
ðYjt  YEjt Þ=Yjt1 Unexpected percentage change (with
respect to consensus forecast) in
the domestic sovereign yield of
country j in quarter t.
Authors’
calculations
%
(continued)
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Table AI. Continued
Variable Symbol Definition Source Units
Bank lending
growth
Percentage growth rate of loans
granted by bank i in country j
to non-financial companies in
quarter t.
IBSI–ECB and au-
thors’
calculations
%
Domestic sover-
eign exposure
of head banks
Exp:Headiht Indirect exposure of subsidiary i
operating in country j to the sover-
eign risk of its home country h 6¼ j,
arising from the sovereign hold-
ings of its head bank. Set to zero if
bank i is a domestic bank of coun-
try j, i.e., if h ¼ j.
IBSI–ECB and au-
thors’
calculations
Bank loan–asset
ratio
Bank loans to non-financial corpor-
ations as a fraction of main assets.
IBSI–ECB
Deposit–liabilities
ratio
Ratio of bank’s deposits to its total
liabilities.
IBSI–ECB
Table AII. Banks’ non-performing loans, public ownership, and bailouts
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i in country j
and quarter t. The stressed countries are Ireland, Italy, and Spain. The non-stressed countries
are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Publicijt is the fraction of
banks’ shares owned by local or national government or publicly controlled institutions
(Fondazioni in Italy, Fundaciones and Cajas in Spain, and Sparkasse and Landesbank in
Germany). VLTROt equals 1 in December 2011 and March 2012, and 0 otherwise. Bailoutijt
equals 1 starting in the quarter t in which bank i in country j was bailed out (unless acquired in
the two subsequent quarters), and 0 before quarter t. DP 10jt1=P
10
jt2 and DP
5
jt1=P
5
jt2 measure
the percentage change of government bond prices in country j and quarter t–1, respectively, for
10-year and 5-year debt. The sample ranges from 2008:Q1 to 2014:Q4. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the bank level and are shown in parentheses: p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
Stressed countries Non-stressed countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bailoutijt1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Publicijt1 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bailoutijt1  DP
10
jt1
P10
jt2
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Publicijt1  DP
10
jt1
P10
jt2
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Bailoutijt1  DP
5
jt1
P5
jt2
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Publicijt1  DP
5
jt1
P5
jt2
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Banks 33 33 30 30
Observations 300 287 351 351
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